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“Excellence R Us”: university research and the
fetishisation of excellence
Samuel Moore1, Cameron Neylon2, Martin Paul Eve3, Daniel Paul O’Donnell4 and Damian Pattinson5
ABSTRACT The rhetoric of “excellence” is pervasive across the academy. It is used to refer
to research outputs as well as researchers, theory and education, individuals and organiza-
tions, from art history to zoology. But does “excellence” actually mean anything? Does this
pervasive narrative of “excellence” do any good? Drawing on a range of sources we inter-
rogate “excellence” as a concept and ﬁnd that it has no intrinsic meaning in academia. Rather
it functions as a linguistic interchange mechanism. To investigate whether this linguistic
function is useful we examine how the rhetoric of excellence combines with narratives of
scarcity and competition to show that the hyper-competition that arises from the perfor-
mance of “excellence” is completely at odds with the qualities of good research. We trace the
roots of issues in reproducibility, fraud, and homophily to this rhetoric. But we also show that
this rhetoric is an internal, and not primarily an external, imposition. We conclude by
proposing an alternative rhetoric based on soundness and capacity-building. In the ﬁnal
analysis, it turns out that that “excellence” is not excellent. Used in its current unqualiﬁed
form it is a pernicious and dangerous rhetoric that undermines the very foundations of good
research and scholarship. This article is published as part of a collection on the future of
research assessment.
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Introduction: the ubiquity of excellence rhetoric
“Excellence” is the gold standard of the university world.Institutional mission statements or advertisements pro-claim, in almost identical language, their “international
reputation for [educational] excellence” (for example, Baylor,
Imperial College London, Loughborough University, Monash
University, The University of Shefﬁeld), or the extent to which
they are guided by principles of “excellence” (University of
Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon, Gustav Adolphus, University
College London, Warwick and so on). University research ofﬁces
and faculties turn this goal into reality through centres and
programmes of “excellence”, which are in turn linked through
networks such as the Canadian “Networks of Centres of
Excellence” or German “Clusters of Excellence” (OECD, 2014;
Networks of Centres of Excellence of Canada 2015). Funding
agencies use “excellence to recognize excellence” (Nowotny,
2014).
The academic funding environment, likewise, is saturated with
this discourse. A study of the National Endowment for the
Humanities is entitled Excellence and Equity (Miller, 2015). The
Wellcome Trust, a large medical funder, has grants for
“sustaining excellence” (Sustaining Excellence Awards, 2016).
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), the largest funder of
civilian science in the United States, claims to fund “the best
science by the best scientists” (Nicholson and Ioannidis, 2012)
and regularly supports “centres of excellence”. The University
Grants Commission of India recently awarded 15 institutions the
title of “University with Potential for Excellence” (University
Grants Commission, 2016). In the United Kingdom, the
“Research Excellence Framework” uses expert assessment of
“excellence” as a means of channelling differential funding to
departments and institutions. In Australia, the national review
framework is known as “Excellence in Research for Australia”. In
Germany, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft supports its
“Clusters of Excellence” through a long standing “Excellence
Initiative” (OECD, 2014).
As this range of examples suggests, “excellence”, as used by
universities and their funders, is a ﬂexible term that operates in a
variety of contexts across a range of registers. It can describe alike
the activities of the world's top research universities and its
smallest liberal arts colleges. It applies to their teaching, research,
and management. It encompasses simultaneously the work of
their Synthetic Biologists and Urban Sociologists, their Anglo-
Saxonists and Concert Pianists. It deﬁnes their Centres for
Excellence in Teaching and their Centres of Excellence for
Mechanical Systems Innovation (The University of Tokyo Global
Center of Excellence, 2016; “USC Center for Excellence in
Teaching”, 2016), their multiculturalism (Ofﬁce of Excellence
and Multicultural Student Success 2016) and their athletic
training programmes (Excellence Academy, 2016). “Excellence”
is used to deﬁne success in academic endeavour from Montreal to
Mumbai.
But what does “excellence” mean? Is there a single standard for
identifying this apparently ubiquitous quality? Or is “excellence”
deﬁned on a discipline-by-discipline, or case-by-case basis? Can
you know “excellence” before you see it? Or is it deﬁned after the
fact? Does the search for “excellence”, its use to reward and
punish individual institutions and researchers, and its utility as a
criterion for the organization of research help or hinder the actual
production of that research and scholarship? Tertiary education
enrols approximately 32% of world’s student age population, and
OECD countries spent on average 1.6% of their GDP on
University-level teaching and research in 2015; the United States
alone spent 2.7% or US$484 billion (The Economist, 2015). Is
“excellence” really the most efﬁcient metric for distributing the
resources available to the world’s scientists, teachers, and
scholars? Does “excellence” live up to the expectations that
academic communities place upon it? Is “excellence” excellent?
And are we being excellent to each other in using it?
This article examines the utility of “excellence” as a means for
organizing, funding, and rewarding science and scholarship. It
argues that academic research and teaching is not well served by
this rhetoric. Nor, we argue, is it well served by the use of
“excellence” to determine the distribution of resources and
incentives to the world’s researchers, teachers and research
institutions. While the rhetoric of “excellence” may seem in the
current climate to be a natural method for determining
which researchers, institutions, and projects should receive
scarce resources, we demonstrate that it is not as efﬁcient,
accurate, or necessary as it may seem. As we show, indeed, a focus
on “excellence” impedes rather than promotes scientiﬁc and
scholarly activity: it at the same time discourages both the
intellectual risk-taking required to make the most signiﬁcant
advances in paradigm-shifting research and the careful “Normal
Science” (Kuhn [1962] 2012) that allows us to consolidate our
knowledge in the wake of such advances. It encourages
researchers to engage in counterproductive conscious and
unconscious gamesmanship. And it impoverishes science and
scholarship by encouraging concentration rather than distribu-
tion of effort. The net result is science and scholarship that is less
reliable, less accurate, and less durable than research assessed
according to other criteria. While we acknowledge that it often
seems politically necessary to argue for “excellence”, and while we
understand that funding and accreditation bodies and agencies
must play a political as well as scientiﬁc game, we here present the
evidence that the internalization of such rhetoric into the research
space can be counter-productive.
The article itself falls into three parts. In the ﬁrst section, we
discuss “excellence” as a rhetoric. Drawing on work by Michèle
Lamont and others, we argue that “excellence” is less a
discoverable quality than a linguistic interchange mechanism by
which researchers compare heterogeneous sets of disciplinary
practices. In the second section, we dig more deeply into the
question of “excellence” as an assessment tool: we show how it
distorts research practice while failing to provide a reliable means
of distinguishing among competing projects, institutions, or
people. In the ﬁnal section, we consider what it might take to
change our thinking on “excellence” and the scarcity it
presupposes. We consider alternative narratives for approaching
the assessment of research activity, practitioners, and institutions
and discuss ways of changing the “scarcity-thinking” that has led
us to our current use of this fungible and unreliable term. We
propose that a narrative built on “soundness” and “capacity”
offers us the opportunity to focus on practice of productive
research and on the crucial role that social communication and
criticism plays. Where there is more heterogeneity and greater
opportunity for diversity of outcomes and perspectives, we argue,
research improves.
What is “excellence”?
In her book, How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of
Academic Judgment, Michèle Lamont opens by noting that
“ ‘excellence’ is the holy grail of academic life” (Lamont, 2009, 1).
Yet, as she quickly moves to highlight, this “excellence is
produced and deﬁned in a multitude of sites and by an array of
actors. It may look different when observed through the lenses of
peer review, books that are read by generations of students,
current articles published by ‘top’ journals, elections at national
academies, or appointments at elite institutions” (3). Or as Jack
Stilgoe suggests: “ ‘Excellence’ tells us nothing about how
important the science is and everything about who decides”
(Stilgoe, 2014).
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This tallies with the work of others who have considered
reforms to the review process in recent years. Kathleen
Fitzpatrick, for instance, has also situated the crux of evaluation
in the evaluator, not the evaluated. For, as Fitzpatrick notes,
“in using a human ﬁltering system, the most important thing
to have information about is less the data that is being ﬁltered,
than the human ﬁlter itself: who is making the decisions, and
why. Thus, in a peer-to-peer review system, the critical activity
is not the review of the texts being published, but the review of
the reviewers.” (Fitzpatrick, 2011, 38)
The challenge here is that it is not possible to conduct a “review
of the reviewers” without some reference to the evaluated
material. It is possible to query the conduct of reviewers or the
process they are (supposed to be) applying against another set of
disciplinary norms (that is, are the reviewers acting in good faith?
Have they provided a useful report? Do they know the ﬁeld as
normatively deﬁned?); but to assess qualitative aspects of
reviewers’ judgment of a speciﬁc work requires an external
evaluation of the work itself—a type of circularity in which a pre-
shared evaluative culture must exist in order to pass judgment on
the evaluation that is its basis: the “shared standards” of which
Lamont writes (2009: 4).
Yet despite the anti-foundational nature of this problem, there
remains a pressing need, in Lamont’s view, to ensure that “peer
review processes [... are] themselves subject to further evaluation”
(247). Calls for training in peer review practices as well as calls for
greater transparency occur across disciplinary boundaries, but
generally without addressing the differences in practice that occur
on either side of those boundaries. Lamont suggests that current
remedies to this problem—which mostly consist of changing the
degrees of anonymity or the point at which review is conducted
(pre- versus post-ﬁlter)—are insufﬁcient and constitute “imper-
fect safeguards”. Instead, she suggests, it is more important that
members of peer-review communities should be educated “about
how peer evaluation works,” avoiding the pitfalls of homophily
(in which review processes merely re-inscribe value to work that
exhibits similitude to pre-existing examples) by re-framing the
debate as a “micro-political process of collective decision making”
that is “genuinely social” (246–247). As with most problems in
scholarly communication, the challenge with peer review is
therefore not technical but social.
As Lamont and others show, then, “excellence” is a pluralized
construct that is speciﬁc to (and conservative within) each
disciplinary environment. Yet even the most obvious solution to
this challenge—interdisciplinary diversity of evaluators—only
leads to further problems. For the differences in practice of
review and perceptions of “excellence” across disciplinary
boundaries, combined with a lack of appreciation that these
differences exist, makes it difﬁcult to reach consensus within such
diverse pools of reviewers. This is because, as Stirling (2007b) has
noted, “it is difﬁcult indeed to contemplate any single general
index of diversity that could aggregate properties [...] in a
uniquely robust fashion”. If diversity itself cannot easily be
collapsed onto a single measurable vector then there is little hope
of aggregating diverse senses of “excellence” into a coherent and
universal framework.
This suggests that “excellence” resides between different
communities and is ill-structured/deﬁned in each context. Local
groups and disciplines may have their own more speciﬁc (though
sometimes conventional rather than explicit) measures of
“excellence”: Biologists may treat some aspects of performance
as “excellent” (for example, number of publications, author
position, citations counts), while failing to recognize aspects
considered equally or more “excellent” by English professors
(large word counts, single authorship, publication or review in
popular literary magazines and journals) (O’Donnell, 2015).
Finally, as we will go on to show, it is clear that evaluative cultures
are operating without even internal consensus beyond a few
broad categories of performance.
That said, it remains tempting to argue that such concepts of
value, even if they are ungrounded and unshared, can be
used pragmatically to foster consensus. This is the point of
Wittgenstein’s (2001: section 293) famous “beetle in a box”
metaphor, which he uses to exemplify the “private language
argument”. For Wittgenstein, the question of unique non-
communicable epistemic knowledge (such as pain experience),
should actually be framed in terms of public, pragmatic
language games/contexts. If we each have an object in a box
that is called a “beetle,” but none of us can see each other’s
“beetles”, he argues, then the important thing is not what the
objects in our boxes actually are but rather how we negotiate and
use the term socially to engender intersubjective understanding or
action. In such cases, “if we construe the grammar of the
expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’,
the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” and
designation is all that matters.
We might therefore productively ask: even if “excellence” is a
concept that carries little or no information content, either within
communities or across them, might it nonetheless be useful as a
“beetle”? That is, as a carrier of interpretation or a set of social
practices functioning as an expert system to convert intrinsic,
qualitative, and non-communicable assessment into a form that
allows performance to be compared across disciplinary or other
boundaries? Might it, indeed, even be useful given the political
necessity for research communities and institutions to present an
(ostensibly) uniﬁed front to government and wider publics as a
means of protecting their autonomy? Could “excellence” be, to
speak bluntly, a linguistic signiﬁer without any agreed upon
referent whose value lies in an ability to capture cross-disciplinary
value judgements and demonstrate the political desirability of
public investment in research and research institutions?
In actual practice, it is not even useful in this way. Although, as
its ubiquity suggests, “excellence” is used across disciplines to
assert value judgements about otherwise incomparable scientiﬁc
and scholarly endeavours, the concept itself mostly fails to
capture the disciplinary qualities it claims to deﬁne. Because it
lacks content, “excellence” serves in the broadest sense solely as
an (aspirational) claim of comparative success: that some thing,
person, activity, or institution can be asserted in a hopefully
convincing fashion to be “better” or “more important” than some
other (often otherwise incomparable) thing, person, activity, or
institution—and, crucially, that it is, as a result, more deserving of
reward. But this emphasis on reward, as Kohn (1999) and others
have demonstrated, is itself often poisonous to the actual qualities
of the underlying activity.
Is “excellence” good for research?
Thus far, we have been arguing that “excellence” is primarily a
rhetorical signalling device used to claim value across hetero-
geneous institutions, researchers, disciplines, and projects rather
than a measure of intrinsic and objective worth. In some cases,
the qualities of these projects can be compared in detail on other
bases; in many—perhaps most—cases, they cannot. As we have
argued, the claim that a research project, institution, or
practitioner is “excellent” is little more than an assertion that
that project, institution, or practitioner can be said to succeed
better on its own terms than some other project, institution, or
practitioner can be said to succeed on some other, usually largely
incomparable, set of terms.
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But what about these sets of “own terms”? How easy is it to
deﬁne the “excellence” of a given project, institution, or
practitioner on an intrinsic basis? Even if we leave aside the
comparative aspect, are there formal criteria that can be used to
identify “excellence” in a single research instance on its own terms
or that of a single discipline?
Research suggests that this is far harder than one might think.
Academics, it turns out, appear to be particularly poor at
recognizing a given instance of “excellence” when they see it, or, if
they think they do, getting others to agree with them. Their
continued willingness to debate relative quality in these terms,
moreover, creates a basis for extreme competition that has serious
negative consequences.
Do researchers recognize excellence when they see it? The short
answer is no. This can be seen most easily when different
potential measures of “excellence” conﬂict in their assessment of a
single paper, project, or individual. Adam Eyre-Walker and Nina
Stoletzki, for example, conclude that scientists are poor at esti-
mating the merit and impact of scientiﬁc work even after it has
been published (2013). Post-publication assessment is prone to
error and biased by the journal in which the paper is published.
Predictions of future impact as measured by citation counts are
also generally unreliable, both because scientists are not good at
assessing merit consistently across multiple metrics and because
the accumulation of citations is itself a highly stochastic process,
such that two papers of similar merit measured on other bases
can accumulate very different numbers of citations just by chance.
Moreover, Wang et al. (2016) show that in terms of citation
metrics the most novel work is systematically undervalued over
the time frames that conventional measures use, including, for
instance, the Journal Impact Factor that Eyre-Walker and Sto-
letzki suggest biases expert assessment.
This is true even of work that can be shown to be successful by
other measures. Campanario, Gans and Shepherd, and others, for
example, have traced the rejection histories of Nobel and other
prize winners, including for papers reporting on results for which
they later won their recognition (Gans and Shepherd, 1994;
Campanario, 2009; Azoulay et al., 2011: 527–528). Campanario
and others have also reported on the initial rejection of papers
that later went on to become among the more highly cited in their
ﬁelds or in the journals that ultimately accepted them
(Campanario, 1993, 1996; Campanario, 1995; Campanario and
Acedo, 2007; Calcagno et al., 2012; Nicholson and Ioannidis,
2012; Siler et al., 2015). Yet others have found a generally poor
relationship between high ratings in grant competitions and
subsequent “productivity” as measured by publication or citation
counts (Pagano, 2006; Costello, 2010; Lindner and Nakamura,
2015; Fang et al., 2016; Meng, 2016).
As this suggests, academics’ abilities to distinguish the
“excellent” from the “not-excellent” do not correlate well with
one another even within the same disciplinary environment
(there tends to be greater agreement at the other end of the scale,
distinguishing the “not acceptable” from the “acceptable,” see
Cicchetti, 1991; Weller, 2001). To earn citations or win prizes for
a rejected manuscript, after all, authors need to begin by
convincing a different journal (and its referees) to accept work
that others previously have found wanting.
But this is not something that only Nobel prize winners are
good at: as Weller reported in the early years of this century, most
(51.4%) rejected manuscripts were ultimately published; in the
vast majority of cases (approximately 90%), these previously
rejected articles were accepted on their second submission and, in
the vast majority of these cases (also approximately 90%),
at a journal of similar prestige and circulation (Weller, 2001).
While these statistics have almost certainly changed in the last
few years with changes in the demographics of submission
and, especially, the development of venues that focus on the
publication of “sound science” (Public Library of Science, 2016),
the basic sense that journal peer review is a gatekeeper that is
frequently circumvented remains.
Articles that are initially rejected and then go on to be
published to great acclaim or even just in journals of a similar or
higher ranking represent what are in essence false negatives in our
ability to assess “excellence.” They are also evidence of terrible
inefﬁciency. The rejection of papers that are subsequently
published with little or no revision at journals of similar rank
increases the costs for everyone involved without any counter-
vailing improvement in quality. In addition to multiplying the
systemic cost of refereeing and editorial management by the
number of resubmissions, such articles also present an opportu-
nity cost to their authors through lost chances to claim priority
for discoveries, for example, or, even more commonly, lost
opportunities for citation and inﬂuence (Gans and Shepherd,
1994; Campanario, 2009; Şekercioğlu, 2013; Brembs, 2015; Psych
Filedrawer, 2016).
More worryingly, there is also considerable evidence of false
positives in the review process—that is to say submissions that are
judged to meet the standards of “excellence” required by one
funding agency, journal, or institution, but do worse when
measured against other or subsequent metrics. In a somewhat
controversial work, Peters and Ceci submitted papers in slightly
disguised form to journals that had previously accepted them for
publication (Peters and Ceci, 1982; see Weller, 2001 for a
critique). Only 8% overall of these resubmissions were explicitly
detected by the editors or reviewers to which they were assigned.
Of the resubmissions that were not explicitly detected, approxi-
mately 90% were ultimately rejected for methodological and/or
other reasons by the same journals that had previously published
them; they were rejected, in other words, for being insufﬁciently
“excellent” by journals that had decided they were “excellent”
enough to enter the literature previously.
When it comes to funding, a similar pattern of false positives
may pertain: a study by Nicholson and Ioannidis (2012) suggests
that highly cited authors are less likely to head major biomedical
research grants than less-frequently-cited but socially better-
connected authors who are associated with granting agency study
groups and review panels. Fang, Bowen and Casadevall have
discovered that “the percentile scores awarded by peer review
panels” at the NIH correlated “poorly” with “productivity as
measured by citations of grant-supported publications” (Fang
et al., 2016). These suggest a bias towards conformance and social
connectedness over innovation in funding decisions in a world in
which success rates are as low as 10%. It also provides further
evidence of funding-agency bias against disruptively innovative
work noted by many researchers over the years (Kuhn [1962]
2012; Campanario, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2009; Costello, 2010;
Ioannidis et al., 2014; Siler et al., 2015).
Fraud, error and lies. To the extent that the above are evidence
of inefﬁciencies in the system, some might argue that individual
problems in determining “excellence” in speciﬁc cases are
resolved in the longer term and over large samples. Of course,
these examples only show work for which multiple measures of
“excellence” can be compared: given their unreliability, this sug-
gests that work that is not measured more than once may be
unjustly suppressed or unjustly published, without us being able
to tell the difference. On the other hand, it is presumably possible
that even such extreme examples of differing perceptions of
“excellence” represent honest differences of opinion as to the
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qualitative merit of the research or researchers. The same cannot
be said, however, of actual fraud and outright errors.
As various studies have concluded, reported instances of both
fraud and error (as measured through retractions) are on the rise
(Claxton, 2005; Dobbs, 2006; Steen, 2011; Fang et al., 2012;
Grieneisen and Zhang, 2012; Yong, 2012b; Chen et al., 2013;
Andrade, 2016). This is particularly true at higher prestige
journals (Resnik et al., 2015; Siler et al., 2015; Belluz, 2016). If we
add to this list of (potentially) “false positives” studies that cannot
be replicated, the number of papers that meet one measure of
“excellence” (that is, passing peer review, often at “top” journals)
while failing others (that is, being accurate and reproducible, and/
or non-fraudulent) rises considerably (Dean, 1989; Burman et al.,
2010; Lehrer, 2010; Bem, 2011; Goldacre, 2011; Yong, 2012b;
Rehman, 2013; Resnik and Dinse, 2013; Hill and Pitt, 2014;
Chang and Li, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). It is the
very focus on “excellence”, however, that creates this situation:
the desire to demonstrate the rhetorical quality of “excellence”
encourages researchers to submit fraudulent, erroneous, and
irreproducible papers, at the same time as it works to prevent the
publication of reproduction studies that can identify such work.
In other words, erroneous, and especially fraudulent or
irreproducible papers are interesting because they represent a
failure of both our ability to identify and predict actual qualitative
“excellence” and the incentive system that is used to encourage
scientists and scholars to produce the kind of sound and
defensible work that should be a sine qua non for quality. As
Fang, Steen, and Casadevall (2012; cf Steen, 2011 for which the
later article represents a correction) have shown, the majority of
retracted papers are withdrawn for reasons of misconduct
including fraud, duplicate publication, or plagiarism (67.4%),
rather than error (21.3%)—although inadvertent error should
presumably itself be disqualiﬁcation from “excellence”. But even
these ﬁgures may under-represent the true incidence of
misconduct. Mistakes and errors made in good faith are a natural
and necessary part of the research process. Yet, as focus groups
and surveys conducted by various researchers have demonstrated,
some forms of error can be misconduct in the form of a (semi-)
deliberate strategy for ensuring quick and/or numerous publica-
tions by “ ‘cutting a little corner’ in order to get a paper out before
others or to get a larger grant,... [or] because... [a researcher]
needed more publications that year” (Anderson et al., 2007: 457–
458; see also Fanelli, 2009; Tijdink et al., 2014; Chubb and
Watermeyer, 2016).
Thus in one small sample of detailed surveys, Fanelli showed
that while only a small percentage of scientists (1.97% pooled
weighted average, n= 7) admitted to fabricating, falsifying, or
modifying data, a much larger percentage claimed to have seen
others engaging in similarly outright fraudulent activity (14.12%,
n= 12). Furthermore, even larger percentages had engaged in
(33.7%) or seen others engage in (72%) questionable research
described using less negatively loaded language (Fanelli, 2009; the
percentage of scientists admitting to explicit misconduct is
considerably higher [15%] in Tijdink et al., 2014). As Fanelli
concludes: “Considering that these surveys ask sensitive questions
and have other limitations, it appears likely that this is a
conservative estimate of the true prevalence of scientiﬁc
misconduct” (2009, 9)—a conclusion very strongly supported
by the anecdotal admissions of Anderson et al.’s focus groups.
The drive for “excellence” in the eyes of assessors is shown even
more starkly in work by Chubb and Watermeyer (2016). In
structured interviews, academics in Australia and the United
Kingdom admitted to outright lies in the claims of broader
impacts made in research proposals. As the authors note: “Having
to sensationalize and embellish impact claims was seen to have
become a normalized and necessary, if regretful, aspect of
academic culture and arguably par for the course in applying for
competitive research funds” (6). Quoting an interviewee, they
continue, “If you can ﬁnd me a single academic who hasn’t had to
bullshit or bluff or lie or embellish to get grants, then I will ﬁnd
you an academic who is in trouble with his [sic] Head of
Department” (6; “[sic]” as in Chubb and Watermeyer). Here we
see how a competitive requirement, perceived or real, for
“excellence”, in combination with a lack of belief in the ability
of assessors to detect false claims, leads to a conception of
“excellence” as pure performance: a concept deﬁned by what you
can get away with claiming in order to suggest (rather than
actually accomplish) “excellence”.
What is striking about these behaviours, of course, is that they
are unrelated to (and to a great extent perhaps even incompatible
with or opposed to) the actual qualities funders, governments,
journal editors and referees, and researchers themselves are
ostensibly using “excellence” to identify. No agency, ministry,
press, or research ofﬁce intentionally uses “excellence” as
shorthand for “able to embellish results or importance convin-
cingly”, even as the researchers being adjudicated under this
system report such embellishment as a primary criterion for
success. Whether it occurs through fraud, cutting corners, or
exaggeration, this performance of “excellence” is commonly
justiﬁed as being necessary for survival, suggesting a cognitive and
cultural dissonance between those aspects of their work that the
performers feel is essential and those aspects they feel they must
emphasise, overstate, embellish, or fabricate to appear more
“excellent” than their competitors. The evidence that fraud and
corner-cutting are a problem at the core of the research process
suggests that the pressure for these performances of “excellence”
is not restricted to stages that do not matter. As Kohn argues,
reward-motivation affects scientiﬁc creativity (the ability to
“break out of the ﬁxed pattern of behaviour that had succeeded
in producing rewards… before”) as much as it does evidence-
gathering or the inﬂation of results (1999, 44; see also Lerner and
Wulf, 2006; Azoulay et al., 2011; Tian and Wang, 2011).
Competition for scarce resources and the performance of
“excellence”. So why do researchers engage in this kind of
dubious activity? Clearly for both Chubb and Watermeyer’s
interviewees, as well as those identiﬁed as having committed
scientiﬁc fraud, it is competition for scarce resources, whether
funding, positions, or community prestige. Of course this is not a
new issue (Smith, 2006). Taking time away from his work on the
difference machine, Charles Babbage published an analysis of
what he saw as the four main kinds of scientiﬁc frauds in an 1830
polemic, Reﬂections on the Decline of Science in England: And on
Some of Its Causes. These included the self-explanatory “hoaxing”
and “forging,” in addition to “trimming” (“clipping off little bits
here and there from those observations which differ most in
excess from the mean and in sticking them on to those which are
too small”) and “cooking” (“an art of various forms, the object of
which is to give ordinary observations the appearance and
character of those of the highest degree of accuracy”) (Babbage,
1831: 178; see Zankl, 2003; and Secord, 2015 for a discussion).
The motivation for these frauds, then as now, involves prestige
and competition for resources. Babbage’s typology of fraudulent
science was but a minor chapter in a book otherwise mostly
concerned with the internal politics of the Royal Society. He
attributed the decline he saw in English science to the lack of
attention and professional opportunities available to potential
scientists. He was, as a result, keenly sensitive to questions of
credit and its importance in determining rank and authority.
Indeed, as Casadevall and Fang remind us, “Since Newton,
science has changed a great deal, but this basic fact has not.
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Credit for work done is still the currency of science…. Since the
earliest days of science, bragging rights to a discovery have gone
to the person who ﬁrst reports it” (Casadevall and Fang, 2012:
13). The prestige of ﬁrst discovery always has been a scarce
resource. Now that that prestige is measured also through the
scarce resource of authorship in “the right journals” and coupled
ever more strongly to the further scarce resources of career
advancement and grant funding, it should not be a surprise that
the competition for those markers has become steadily stronger.
The performance of “excellence” has become more marked
as a result.
If scandals such as fraudulent articles were the only way in
which this overwhelming competitive focus on “excellence” hurt
research, it would be bad enough. But the emphasis on rewarding
the performance of “excellence” also has a more general impact
on research capacity: it is the mechanism by which “the Matthew
effect”—that is, the disproportionate accrual of resources to those
researchers and institutions that are already well-rewarded—
operates in a hyper-competitive research environment, creating
distortions throughout the research cycle, even for work that is
not fraudulent or the result of misconduct (Bishop, 2013; as its
etymology implies, the “Matthew effect” predates today’s
hypercompetition, see Merton, 1968, 1988)1: it increases the
stakes of the competition for resources and, as a result,
encourages gamesmanship; creates a bias towards (non-
disruptively) novel, positive, and even inﬂated results on the
part of authors and editors; and discourages the pursuit and
publication of types of “Normal Science” (such as replication
studies) that are crucial to the viability of the research enterprise,
without being glamorous enough to suggest that their authors are
“excellent”.
Positive bias and the decline effect. Just how destructive this
need to perform “excellence” is can be illustrated by the well-
known bias towards positive results in scientiﬁc publication (for
example, Dickersin et al., 1987, 2005; Sterling, 1959; Kennedy,
2004; Young and Bang, 2004; Bertamini and Munafò, 2012;
Rothstein, 2014; Psych Filedrawer, 2016). Thus, for example,
Fanelli (2011) demonstrated a 22% growth between 1990 and
2007 in the “frequency of papers that, having declared to have
‘tested’ a hypothesis, reported a positive support for it”. This is all
the more remarkable given that the late 1980s were themselves
not a halcyon period of unbiased science: in an 1987 study of 271
unpublished and 1041 published trials, Dickersin et al. found that
14% of unpublished and 55% of published trials favoured the
experimental therapy (1987). As Young et al. suggest, “the general
paucity in the literature of negative data” is such that “[i]n some
ﬁelds, almost all published studies show formally signiﬁcant
results so that statistical signiﬁcance no longer appears dis-
criminating” (2008, 1419).
Another artifact of this positive bias is the “decline effect,” or
the tendency for the strength of evidence for a particular ﬁnding
to decline over time from that stated on its ﬁrst publication
(Schooler, 2011; Gonon et al., 2012; Brembs et al., 2013; Groppe,
2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). While this effect is also
well-known, Brembs et al. have recently shown that its presence is
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with journal prestige as
measured by Impact Factor: early papers appearing in high
prestige journals report larger effects than subsequent studies
using smaller samples (2013, see Figs. 1b and 1c in this reference).
The bias against replication. Finally, there is a bias against the
publication of replication studies in disciplines where such pat-
terns make scientiﬁc sense. Indeed, there are currently insufﬁcient
structural incentives to perform work that “merely” revalidates
existing studies, fuelled by a focus on novelty in most deﬁnitions
of “excellence”. As Nosek et al. note
Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such,
disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and report-
ing decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative
results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inﬂate
the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives
favour novelty over replication, false results persist in the
literature unchallenged, reducing efﬁciency in knowledge
accumulation. (2012)
This bias against replication is even more remarkable, however,
when it involves studies that invalidate rather than conﬁrm the
original result, especially when the original result has a high
proﬁle or is potentially ﬁeld-deﬁning—qualities that one would
assume would increase the novelty and interest of the (non)
replication itself (Goldacre, 2011; Wilson, 2011; Nosek et al.,
2012; Yong, 2012a, b; Aldhous, 2011; for a view from the other
side of replication, see Bissell, 2013). This is in part, a function of
publishing economics: commercial journals earn money from
subscription, access, and reprint fees (Lundh et al., 2010); high
proﬁle results and a high prestige reﬂected by a high Impact
Factor help maintain the demand for these journals and hence
ensure both a continuing stream of interesting new material and a
steady or rising income for the journal as a whole (Lawrence,
2007; Munafò et al., 2009; Lundh et al., 2010; Marcovitch, 2010).
Undercutting (or perhaps even qualifying) the high-proﬁle results
that help bring in these subscribers, new articles, and attention
attacks the very foundation of this success—a journal that
publishes high proﬁle but incorrect papers is undercutting its case
for subscription and author submissions. One doesn’t need to
imagine a conspiracy to promote poor science to understand how
a conscious or unconscious bias against replication studies might
arise under such circumstances.
The reluctance of major journals to publish replication studies
embeds this bias in the incentive system that guides authors. As
Wilson notes:
[M]ajor journals simply won't publish replications. This is a real
problem: in this age of Research Excellence Frameworks and
other assessments, the pressure is on people to publish in high
impact journals. Careful replication of controversial results is
therefore good science but bad research strategy under these
pressures, so these replications are unlikely to ever get run. Even
when they do get run, they don't get published, further reducing
the incentive to run these studies next time. The ﬁeld is left with
a series of “exciting” results dangling in mid-air, connected only
to other studies run in the same lab. (2011)
As Rothstein (2014) argues “The consequences of this problem
include the danger that readers and reviewers will reach the
wrong conclusion about what the evidence shows, leading at
times to the use of unsafe or ineffective treatments”.
Homophily. Thus far, we have been discussing the negative
impact of “excellence” largely in terms of its effect on the practice
and results of professional researchers. There is, however, another
effect of the drive for “excellence”: a restriction in the range of
scholars, of the research and scholarship performed by such
scholars, and the impact such research and scholarship has on the
larger population. Although “excellence” is commonly presented
as the most fair or efﬁcient way to distribute scarce resources
(Sewitz, 2014), it in fact can have an impoverishing effect on the
very practices that it seeks to encourage. A funding programme
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that looks to improve a nation’s research capacity by differentially
rewarding “excellence” can have the paradoxical effect of redu-
cing this capacity by underfunding the very forms of “normal”
work that make science function (Kuhn [1962] 2012) or distract
attention from national priorities and well-conducted research
towards a focus on performance measures of North America and
Europe (Vessuri et al., 2014). A programme that seeks to reward
Humanists, similarly, by focussing on output in “high impact”
academic journals paradoxically reduces the impact of these same
disciplines by encouraging researchers to focus on their profes-
sional peers rather than broader cultural audiences (Readings,
1996), reducing the domain’s relevance even as its performance of
“excellence” improves. A programme of concentration on the
“best” academics, in other words, can have the effect of focussing
attention on problems and approaches in which “excellence” can
be performed most easily rather than those that could beneﬁt the
most (or provide the greatest actual impact) from increased
attention.
Moreover, a concentration on the performance of “excellence”
can promote homophily among the scientists themselves. Given
the strong evidence that there is systemic bias within the
institutions of research against women, under-represented ethnic
groups, non-traditional centres of scholarship, and other
disadvantaged groups (for a forthright admission of this bias
with regard to non-traditional centres of scholarship, see
Goodrich, 1945), it follows that an emphasis on the performance
of “excellence”—or, in other words, being able to convince
colleagues that one is even more deserving of reward than others
in the same ﬁeld—will create even stronger pressure to conform
to unexamined biases and norms within the disciplinary culture:
challenging expectations as to what it means to be a scientist is a
very difﬁcult way of demonstrating that you are the “best” at
science; it is much easier if your appearance, work patterns, and
research goals conform to those of which your adjudicators have
previous experience. In a culture of “excellence” the quality of
work from those who do not work in the expected “normative”
fashion run a serious risk of being under-estimated and
unrecognised (King et al., 2014, 2016; O’Connor and O’Hagan,
2015; University of Arizona Commission on the Status of
Women, 2015; this is, in part, an explanation for the systemically
underreported and poorly acknowledged and rewarded work of
women “assistants” in many of the great scientiﬁc discoveries of
the twentieth century). There is a clear case to answer that, absent
substantial corrective measures and awareness, a focus on
“excellence” will continue to maintain rather than work to
overcome social barriers to participation in research by currently
underrepresented groups.
Homophily is in some senses a variant on Merton’s “Matthew
effect,” discussed above. It is also a variant on the old argument
that existing power structures—those populated by those whom it
is assumed already exemplify “excellence”—tend towards con-
servatism in their processes of evaluation. It underpins the calls to
reassess the focus of mainstream scholarship, whether this is
“great men” history, the “Dead White Male” in literary “canon”,
or the bias towards the ills of the western male patient in medical
research. As Barbara Herrnstein Smith says with respect to
literary evaluation:
…[a work that “endures”] will also also begin to perform
certain characteristic cultural functions by virtue of the very
fact that it has endured...In these ways, the canonical work
begins increasingly not merely to survive within but to shape
and create the culture in which its value is produced and
transmitted and, for that very reason, to perpetuate the
conditions of its own ﬂourishing. (Herrnstein Smith, 1988
emphasis in the original)
In other words, the works that—and the people who—are
considered “excellent” will always be evaluated, like the canon
that shapes the culture that transmits it, on a conservative basis:
past performance by preferred groups helps establish the norms
by which future performances of “excellence” are evaluated.
Whether it is viewed as a question of power and justice or simply
as an issue of lost opportunities for diversity in the cultural co-
production of knowledge, an emphasis on the performance of
“excellence” as the criterion for the distribution of resources and
opportunity will always be backwards looking, the product of an
evaluative process by institutions and individuals that is
established by those who came before and resists disruptive
innovation in terms of people as much as ideas or process.
Alternative narratives: working for change
If, as we have argued, “excellence” in all its many forms and
meanings is both unreliable as a measure of actual quality, and
pernicious in the way it promotes poor behaviour and
discourages good, what then are the alternatives? Given the
political realities that have promoted the use of this rhetoric in
defence of science and scholarship, are there other, less damaging
ways in which we can evaluate and promote the value of research
and its communication?
Because “excellence” is used so ubiquituously across the
research space, a complete answer to this question is far beyond
the scope of any single paper: there is no single alternative that
can replace the rhetoric of “excellence” in scholarly publishing,
research funding, government and university policy, public
relations, and promotion and tenure practices. In some areas,
moreover, technological and economic changes suggest fairly
obvious directions in which progress is being made—a prime
example being the change from the physical scarcity that
characterized print journals, adjudication to the abundance that,
technically at least, characterizes a web-based publication
infrastructure (for well-known discussions of this, see Shirky,
2010; Nielsen, 2012).
In many ways, however, the greatest challenge is research
funding and infrastructure. The continuing competition for
government and private funds raises questions of prioritization
and adjudication that are unlikely to be rapidly answered by
changes in technology or attitudes. A central test of our critique
of rhetorics of “excellence” is therefore to ask whether there are
any alternatives in this arena. Since funding applications tend to
collect examples of “excellence” from other aspects of the research
enterprise as a form of justiﬁcation (success in funding is a
function of one's ability to demonstrate “excellence” in different
types of performance), it also represents the apex of the problem.
Perhaps because it is so hard, the tendency in policy, at least in
the traditional North Atlantic centres of research in the last
several decades, has clearly been in a non-distributive direction:
for the concentration of resources on “top” institutions (in earlier
periods, such as the early space race, for example, the focus was
arguably more distributive). The Research Excellence Framework
in the United Kingdom (REF) and massive new research centres
such as the Crick in London are intended to create a “critical
mass” of “excellent” or “world-leading” research. In Canada,
which is an outlier internationally in the push towards
stratiﬁcation (Usher, 2016), it remains the case that the “top”
universities (which have their own independent lobby group),
receive a disproportionate share of research resources when
measured, for example, against the percentage of students
(including Doctoral students) they educate (U15 Group of
Canadian Research Universities/Regroupement des universités
de recherche du Canada, 2016). In the much larger U.S. post
secondary system, ten universities received nearly 20% of all
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government research funds; as Weigley and Hess note, while
these universities are among the richest in the country in terms of
their endowments, public funding still constitutes the largest part
of their R&D funding (2013).
Many have questioned the value of such an inequitable
distribution of funds when a less concentrated, or less unequal,
distribution could achieve greater outcomes. Dorothy Bishop
argues, with respect to the REF that there should be less of a
disparity between rewarding research that is perceived to be “the
best” and that which is perceived as merely average. Instead,
Bishop (2013) argues, all research submitted to the REF should
receive some funding and the perceived best research should
receive a smaller overall proportionate gain. This would have the
beneﬁt of decreasing the funding gulf between elite and middle-
tier universities and would encourage diversity in the process. Of
course such an approach may be politically troublesome for the
academy, as long as the criterion it promotes is relative
“excellence” rather than, say, “capacity”, “breadth”, “soundness”,
“comprehensiveness” or “accessibility”. If funding is allocated on
a scattered basis, following the logic that predictive approaches to
quality are weak at best, then the authority claims of the
university are substantially devalued as long as the rhetoric
used to defend them privileges a “winner-take-all” measure of
effectiveness.
There is, however, a compelling case to be made for the value
of greater redistribution of research funding. Cook et al. (2015)
showed that for UK Bioscience groups an optimal allocation of
ﬁxed resources would involve spreading the money between a
larger number of smaller groups. This was the case whether
number of publications or number of citations were used as the
measure of productivity. A similar conclusion is reached by
Fortin and Currie who argue that scientiﬁc impact is only “weakly
money-limited” and that a more productive strategy would be to
distribute funds based on “diversity” rather than perceptions of
“excellence” (Fortin and Currie, 2013). Gordon and Poulin
argued that, for science funding in Canada through the National
Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC, the main
STEM funding agency), it would have cost less at a whole system
level simply to distribute the average award to all eligible
applicants than to incur the costs associated with preparing,
reviewing and selecting proposals (2009; although see Roorda,
2009 for a critique of their calculation). A rough calculation of the
system costs of preparing failed grant applications would suggest
that they are in the same order of magnitude as research grant
funding itself (Herbert et al., 2013).
What this suggests is that “excellence” is not the only policy
choice concerning the resourcing of research, nor even,
necessarily, the only politically compelling one: from concentrat-
ing resources on the most deserving, allegedly “excellent”,
institutions and researchers, to distributing them amongst all
those that meet some minimum criteria—or even some subset, by
lottery (Health Research Council of New Zealand, 2016; Fang
et al., 2016), arguments can be made for a variety of different
methods of funding research. In the context of scarce resources
and a desire to maximize outcomes, indeed, there is even an
argument for focussing most attention on the worst institutions;
those that might most beneﬁt from resources to improve (Bishop,
2013), have the greatest scope for improvement, and would go the
longest way to ensuring an increase in basic capacity. In this case,
rather than “excellence” appraisers would be looking for some
sort of baseline level of qualiﬁcation, “credibility” (Morgan, 2016),
perhaps, or “soundness”. This would be a shift from focussing on
evaluation of outputs to an evaluation of practice.
The challenge with any redistributive scheme is how to engage
with politics. While proposing interesting and valuable thought
experiments, they do not address the needs of working with
governments who need to account for the distribution of public
funds and may fear the optics of a system built on criteria other
than “the best”. The narrative and the need for “excellence” (like
that of “international competitiveness”) is important as a shared
language of externally recognizable symbols that justify funding
to government and to wider publics.
As noted earlier, this serves the interests of those who have
already “earned” the label. The local construction of “excellence”
is inherently conservative, and maintaining its structures serves
the interests of those who hold local power. Therefore, narratives
arguing for redistribution need to be more than just interesting
ideas and more than simply factually correct. They need to be
politically as well as intellectually compelling.
Soundness and capacity over “excellence”. This is where a
rhetoric built around “soundness” and “capacity” offers oppor-
tunities. The idea that “sound research is good research”, and
“more research is better than less”—that our focus should be on
thoroughness, completeness, and appropriate standards of
description, evidence, and probity rather than ﬂashy claims of
superiority—presents an alternative to the existing notions of
“excellence”. Such a narrative also addresses deeper concerns
regarding a breakdown in research culture through hypercom-
petition. These terms resonate with public and funder concerns
for value, and they align with the need for improved commu-
nications and wider engagement encouraged by many govern-
ments and agencies.
It might be argued in the case of “soundness” in particular that
the term is as subjective as “excellence”. Stirling (2007a) has
argued that the implication that expert analysis can be free from
subjective values in determining something like “soundness” is
itself misleading and exclusionary. Certainly “soundness” or
“scientiﬁcness” rhetorics have been used to give credibility to
controversial technologies and to shut a range of perspectives out
of public discourse in ways that are similar to uses of “excellence”
we have criticized.
But the evaluation of “soundness” is based in the practice of
scholarship, whereas “excellence” is a characteristic of its objects
(outputs and actors). In this sense “soundness” aligns well with
approaches that locate the value of scholarship and evaluation in
the nature of its processes (that is, “proper practice”) and its
social conduct. While disagreeing on what the outputs of research
can actually mean, scholars from Fleck, through Merton, Kuhn,
Ravetz and Latour have all focussed on how practice in a social
context in which norms and ethics are sustained and enforced
leads to productive scholarship (Fleck [1935] 1979; Ravetz, 1973;
Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987). “Soundness” can be
assessed by how it supports socially developed and documentable
processes and norms. In contrast assessment of “excellence”
depends on how convincing the performance of importance and
impact is. Like “excellence” the criteria for “soundness” are
not universal qualities distinct from pre-existing socially devel-
oped practice; but in contrast to “excellence”, the qualities of
“soundness” can be benchmarked. They are also more precise:
“excellence” in the senses we are discussing is used describe the
competitive position of an entire performance in relation to
others; “soundness” focusses on details: statistical or bibliographic
appropriateness, say, or well-chosen evidence.
Another question about “soundness” involves its cross-
disciplinary application. What is “soundness” in the context of
the Humanities? Eve (2014, 144) has suggested that “soundness”
in a humanities paper might involve the ability to “evince an
argument; make reference to the appropriate range of extant
scholarly literature; be written in good, standard prose of an
appropriate register that demonstrates a coherence of form and
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content; show a good awareness of the ﬁeld within which it was
situated; pre-empt criticisms of its own methodology or
argument; and be logically consistent”. More recently, Morgan
(2016) has suggested that “credibility” may be the humanities
equivalent of “soundness”. Others have focussed on the term
“quality” in the sense in which it used in quality assurance
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003), as
ﬁtness for an explicitly deﬁned purpose. As we have argued above
all of these appear to capture the sense that productive
scholarship can be deﬁned by allegiance to socially deﬁned
research practice as much as performance of success.
Our argument here is not that expanding our boundary for
resourcing from “excellence” to “soundness” and “capacity” is all
that is necessary to change research culture and improve the
distribution of resources; rather, it is that a move from resourcing
based on the performance of an ineluctable quality to one based
on the demonstration of documentable, socially developed
practice, is the ﬁrst step to solving the problems our rhetoric of
“excellence” has created. Soundness appears be a plausible basis
on which to build a new narrative, or rather to combine existing
threads into a more consistent rhetorical framework. Such a
framework will work to refocus our attention on research that is
sufﬁciently valuable to be worth pursuing. To drive adoption and
practice towards making this real, however, will require more
than narrative. It will need resources to be redistributed towards
supporting a broader class of research activities.
Do soundness and capacity sell? Although we have been
focussing on funding, the rhetoric of soundness and capacity,
about the idea that the most important quality of research is that
it be done and done with care, does resonate with other aspects of
the research enterprise.
Some examples of this are the broad area of reproducibility
(Burman et al., 2010; Lehrer, 2010; Goldacre, 2011; Yong, 2012b;
Rehman, 2013; Chang and Li, 2015; Open Science Collaboration,
2015), reporting guidelines for animal experiments (Kilkenny
et al., 2010) and clinical trials (Schulz et al., 2010), and work on
registered replication studies in social psychology (Simons et al.,
2014). All have been areas of substantial professional and popular
discussion and the emphasis on the need for clarity of description
and “doing things properly” is consistent. The idea that research
must be reproducible, safe, and complete can be at least as
compelling an argument as that it must be simply excellent.
Another place where the rhetoric of “soundness” and
“capacity” has booked considerable success is the online journal
PLOS ONE and the journals that have since begun to follow its
approach.2 PLOS ONE was launched with the stated aim of
publishing any scientiﬁc research that was deemed technically
sound, regardless of its perceived novelty or impact. This
approach was made possible by two developments in academic
publishing—the move to fully online publications without the
need for print editions, and the growing acceptance of Article
Processing Charge (APC)-funded Open Access as a viable
publication model. These enabled the journal to consider and
publish any manuscript that met its criteria, with no limitations
on page space or ﬁxed subscription revenue. As a result, the
journal grew very quickly, becoming the largest journal in the
world within 5 years of launching (MacCallum, 2011).
The PLOS ONE model has been widely emulated, with almost
every major scientiﬁc publisher now offering a journal with
similar editorial criteria. This has created a competitive landscape
with interesting properties. Traditional journals compete by
seeking to publish the most “excellent” papers that they can
attract and demonstrate this by the number of papers they reject.
This also leads authors to self-select for submission to those
journals only the papers they consider most important–avoiding,
for example, “wasting” anybody’s time by submitting “non-
original” work such as replication studies. Over time, success in
this venture, its own form of hypercompetition, leads to a
differentiated set of ranked journals driven by their own
performative targets, or aspirations to join the top ranks. Authors
and editors engage in a cycle of performance that reduces the
breadth of research journals are willing to publish and authors
willing to submit.
PLOS ONE and its competitors also compete, but on quite
different terms and in ways that arguably improve rather than
imperil the research enterprise. Speed of publication, for example,
always features in author surveys, and journals like PLOS ONE
often advertise their average turnaround times. They even
compete on the basis of journal prestige, reputation and Impact
Factor (Solomon, 2014), albeit with a heavier emphasis on
soundness and number of publications (that is, capacity) rather
than exclusivity and “excellence”. Even when the criteria for
inclusion is only soundness, membership in the club of authors
still provides a prestige beneﬁt: that the doors of the club are more
open does not necessarily mean that there is no beneﬁt to
membership (Potts et al., 2016).
But PLOS ONE and similar journals also demonstrate that it is
not simply enough to create mechanisms that test for soundness
and capacity. Even when offered a distributive narrative,
researchers often still ﬁnd it difﬁcult to avoid the concentrating
rhetoric of “excellence”. A common complaint from the managers
of journals such as PLOS ONE, indeed, is that their journals’
referees, who are usually made up of previous authors, often seek
to reject papers that they feel do not meet their own perceptions
of “excellence,” instead of focussing on the journal’s formal
criterion of “soundness”. Many anecdotes from PLOS ONE
authors, likewise, involve being surprised by how tough the
refereeing process was for their articles—a response that signals
relative “excellence” that might otherwise not be apparent to the
reader (see especially Curry, 2012 and comments). The
performance of “excellence”, the signalling of relative superiority
through an additional line on the CV, is still more important
from a career perspective than the science itself: nobody gets
tenure for publishing to arXiv, no matter how good the quality of
their research. At least that appears to be what most tenure-track
academics believe. And while reader attention or online
conversation are gaining some currency as indicators of qualities
valued in an article, the current discourse indicates that authors
need to feel that they have cleared a higher bar than they in
fact have.
In other words, initiatives like PLOS ONE will have truly
succeeded in changing researchers’ own bias towards (ultimately
undemonstrable) “excellence” only when their rejection rate is
seen to be less important than the evidence that controls are in
place to ensure and encourage the recognition of “soundness”.
Caveats and further work
The potential scope of the project of this article is huge, and we
have only been able to touch on some of its aspects. We have
focused on narratives and rhetoric and sought to bring evidence
of how existing rhetorics are damaging. What we have not done,
as a variety of both anonymous reviewers and non-anonymous
commenters have noted, is address the power politics that
underlie many of the structures that we are critiquing. Nor have
we analysed the degree to which different actors within the
system are able to enact change.
Understanding how the changes we propose in narrative
and indeed culture can be achieved politically and institutionally
is a much larger project, one on which others are already engaged
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and one that is critically important in the current political
climate. Institutional change is challenging and slow. We hope
that alongside the criticism, implicit and explicit of some
existing institutions, we have offered some routes forward to be
investigated and explored.
We have also not undertaken a historical analysis. While we
draw on literature from a range of periods we have not
addressed how and when our current narratives developed.
While we would argue that it has deep roots, we have neither the
expertise nor the space to probe the history through which
excellence rhetorics became institutionalized in their current
forms. The differing registers and locations of excellence rhetorics
over time—policing access to the right clubs, publication in the
right journals, career success and contributions to institutional
funding—is deserving of further study and would additionally
strengthen the political analysis.
Closing the loop: planning for cultural change
In this article, we have advanced an argument that “excellence” is
not just unhelpful to realising the goals of research and research
communities but actively pernicious. A narrative of scarcity
combined with “excellence” as an interchange mechanism leads
to concentration of resources and thence hypercompetition.
Hypercompetition in turn leads to greater (we might even say
more shameless, see Anderson et al., 2007; Fanelli, 2009; Tijdink
et al., 2014; Chubb and Watermeyer, 2016) attempts to perform
this “excellence”, driving a circular conservatism and reiﬁcation
of existing power structures while harming rather than improving
the qualities of the underlying activity.
We have also argued that, while many commentaries reviewed
throughout this piece lay the blame for this at the feet of external
actors—institutional administrators captured by neo-liberal
ideologies, funders over-focussed on delivering measurable
returns rather than positive change, governments obsessed with
economic growth at the cost of social or community value—the
roots of the problem in fact lie in the internal narratives of the
academy and the nature of “excellence” and “quality” as
supposedly shared concepts that researchers have developed into
shields of their autonomy. The solution to such problems lies not
in arguing for more resources for distribution via existing
channels as this will simply lead to further concentration and
hypercompetition. Instead, we have argued, these internal
narratives of the academy must be reformulated.
Finally, we have argued for a more pluralistic approach to the
distribution of resources and credit. Where competition does take
place it should do so on the basis of the many different qualities,
plural, that are important to different communities using and
creating research. But it should also be recognized that
competition is not, in this context, an unalloyed good. In the
context of assessing the risks of application of research Stirling
and others argue for “broadening out and opening up” the
technology assessment process (Ely et al., 2014, see also Stilgoe,
2014), that is to say increasing both the set of criteria considered
and the range of people who have a voice in its assessment and
application. The same approach needs to be applied to research
assessment itself.
This leads to our argument for a focus on redistribution instead
of concentration, which, we suggest, is necessary for three core
reasons. Firstly because “excellence” cannot be recognized or
deﬁned consensually, except as a Wittgensteinian “beetle in a
box” that no-one has ever seen, and even then, unlike
Wittgenstein’s beetle-owners, by researchers who cannot agree
even within disciplinary communities on which aspects of
“excellence” might matter or be useful. Second because, as we
have argued, there is a case to be made for redistribution on its
own merits. Unlike concentration, and the hypercompetition to
which it leads, which break down our standards and cultures
in systematic, predictable, and negative ways, redistribution
enhances capacity and breadth of participation. And thirdly, we
have shown that top-loading of research funding based upon
anti-foundational principles of “excellence” is likely to hurt the
incremental advances upon which research implicitly relies.
The argument for redistribution is a challenging one to
advance. The rhetorics of scarcity, of concentration and
competition are linked to strong cultural and economic
narratives, particularly in the United Kingdom and United States.
But as a route towards this goal we have argued that it is possible
to build upon existing narratives of “soundness”, “credibility” and
“capacity”—which is to say on narratives of reproducibility,
transparency, high-quality reporting, and a breadth and diversity
of activity—to build a case for strong cultural practices that focus
on fundamental standards that deﬁne proper scholarly and
scientiﬁc practice. This focus on the practice of research,
including its communications, rather than the performance of
success at research can also be aligned with developing narratives
of Responsible Research and Innovation and public engagement.
For instance the approach of Post-Normal Science advocated by
Funtowicz and Ravetz (2003; 1990), focuses on assessing the
quality of the process of research practice, and emphasises the
need to effectively communicate the weaknesses of any claims
made on the basis of research.
In taking this approach we root the discourse in long-standing
traditions and culture, while also engaging with the newer
concerns. It is through showing that we can recognize sound and
credible research and that we can build strong cultures and
communities around that recognition, that we lay the ground-
work for making the case for redistribution. And that would be
excellent.
Notes
1 The name of the Matthew Effect is derived from Matthew 13:12: “For whosoever hath,
to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not,
from him shall be taken away even that he hath”.
2 As noted in the disclosure of competing interests, three of the authors of this article
have worked for PLOS previously.
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